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Abstract

A theoretical model is presented that identifies environmental and organiza
tional characteristics that affect human resource (HR) performance in an organi
zation. Specifically, we address the issue of when and under what circumstances
does HR outsourcing contribute value to the firm by attempting to identifY environ
mental and organizational characteristics that affect HR department performance
and how HR outsourcing mediates that relationship. We propose that supplier
competition in the HR provider market has a direct effect on the amount of HR
outsourcing which in turn has a direct effect on HR performance. Environmental
uncertainty (primary, competitive, and supplier) is proposed to moderate there
lationship between amount of HR outsourcing and HR performance while asset
specificity is proposed to moderate the relationship between supplier competition
and amount of HR outsourcing. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the Southwest Academy of Management meeting in Houston, Texas, March, 2003,
and received the 2003 Irwin/McGraw-Hill Distinguished Paper Award.

Introduction

Human resource outsourcing has become a major part of human resource (HR)
operations for the last few years. A 2004 joint study conducted by the Society
for Human Resource Management (SHRM) and the Bureau of National Affairs
(BNA) found that two-thirds of HR executives surveyed say their HR depart
ments outsource at least one HR activity (Bureau of National Affairs, 2004),
with this activity expected to increase. Proctor & Gamble (P&G), for instance,
signed an agreement with IBM that took effect in January 2004 and led to the
outsourcing of P&G's worldwide HR services, valued at $400 million to IBM.
Despite the increased activity, however, there is recognition that careful planning
should be employed before making the decision to outsource. In fact, a separate
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2004 SHRM human resource outsourcing survey found that in some cases HR
outsourcing led to a decrease in customer service (25% of respondents), a less
personal relationship with employees (37% of respondents), and a decrease in
employee morale (6% of respondents). The information contained in these two re
cent surveys seems to indicate that a good understanding of the factors that drive
HR outsourcing and a good understanding of the expected outcomes is necessary
to ensure that organizations fulfill their HR functions in a manner that allows them
to remain competitive in their respective industries.
Literature Review
In many studies that discuss outsourcing, cost benefits appear to be a com
pelling argument for contracting out services previously performed internally
(e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Belous, 1989; Greer, Youngblood, & Gray, 1999;
G upta & Gupta, 1992; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002; Lever, 1997), and Vin
ing & G loberman ( 1999) note that empirical data from government agencies
outsourcing to private suppliers generated savings in the range of 20-30% in
production costs. However, some of these same studies caution that cost should
not be the only factor considered in the decision to outsource. Other factors to
c onsider include vendor expertise, customer and employee satisfaction (Barthe
lemy, 2003; Greer, Youngblood & Gray, 1999; Gupta & Gupta, 1992), and loss
o f strategic advantage (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Greer, Youngblood & Gray,
1999, Gupta & Gupta, 1992; Lever, 1997). In a more recent study, Adler (2003)
notes that a review by the Gartner group listed six factors that are important in
o utsourcing decisions: dependency risk, spillover risk, trust, relative proficiency,
strategic capabilities, and flexibility. The first four of these are classified as short
term factors, whereas the last two can be considered more long-term or strate
gic. However, no clear formula exists that identifies when outsourcing is most
efficient and effective. There are also very few empirical studies that examine
the performance implications of make or buy decisions (e.g. Leiblein, Reuer, &
Dalsace, 2002). Rather, studies seem to concentrate on the reasons organizations
outsource, how to outsource, or the impact of outsourcing on the organization
and its employees.
Notably absent from the literature is the question of when outsourcing is most
appropriate or under what circumstances an organization should outsource to
increase human resources (HR) performance. In other words, are there internal
a nd external forces that are conducive to HR outsourcing? If these forces can
be identified, they may provide some clues concerning the appropriate action to
take when outsourcing is being considered. This is especially important since
67% of HR departments outsourced one or more functions in 2004 (Bureau of
N ational Affairs, 2004 ). We specifically address the issue of when and under what
c ircumstances does HR outsourcing contribute value to the firm by attempting
to idcnti ty environmental and organizational characteristics that affect H R per
formance and how HR outsourcing mediates that relationship.
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A separate issue concerning the current outsourcing research is the absence of
studies looking at the HR function in organizations. Although there are numerous
theoretical and empirical articles on outsourcing organizational functions such
as information systems and accounting, the academic literature on outsourcing
the HR function is almost non-existent. Although Klaas (2003) developed a
framework that helps analyze HR outsourcing factors in small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) by explicating on the relationship between SMEs and the
professional employer organizations and Gainey and Klaas (2003) analyze HR
outsourcing specifically in the context oftraining and development, these studies
are the exception rather than the rule. This fact is surprising given that many HR
functions such as payroll, benefits, training, and recruiting are often outsourced
by organizations (Gilley, Greer & Rasheed, 2004; Lever, 1997).
The SHRM Human Resource Outsourcing Survey Report, released in June 2004,
found that HR functions that are entirely outsourced are generally background
checking, employee assistance/counseling, and Flexible Spending Account (FSA)
administration. The functions that are partially outsourced include administration
of health care benefits, pension benefits administration, and payroll. Despite this
increase in HR outsourcing activity, to date, the empirical articles on outsourcing
HR functions focus on the impact of organizational characteristics (Klaas, Mc
Clendon & Gainey, 2001), the role of transaction costs (Gainey & Klaas, 2003;
Klaas, 2003; Klaas, McClendon & Gainey, 1999), the relationship between HR
department size and outsourcing activity (Pommerenke & Stout, 1996), and the
rationale and consequences ofHR outsourcing (Greer, Youngblood & Gray, 1999;
Lever, I 997). The question concerning when to outsource HR practices based on
the internal and external forces driving the firm to consider outsourcing, however,
is not directly addressed, although Klaas, McClendon & Gainey (1999) come
close in their analysis of moderator variables in the relationship between amount
of HR outsourcing and perceived benefits from outsourcing. A separate article
by Klaas, McClendon and Gainey (2001) also touches on certain organizational
characteristics that lead firms to outsource HR activities, but does not consider
HR performance as a dependent variable. As such, it is necessary to address the
question of when to outsource the HR function by looking into the theoretical
issues of outsourcing in the literature representing disciplines other than HR to
form a basis for I-IR outsourcing. However, a brief discussion of definitions and
HR activities is presented first.
In this paper, the term outsourcing will refer to the action of allowing external
vendors to perform an entire HR activity (such as training, payroll, etc.) for an
organization. The term insourcing will refer to the action of the organization
performing the entire HR activity in-house, and the term co-sourcing will refer
to the action of allowing an organization's HR generalist to work with external
vendors on some activities, or to the action of allowing HR specialists to work
as consultants to line managers who actually perform HR duties.
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T he HR Valu e Chain
The HR func ti ons performed in an organi zation can be thought of as a chain
of events o r tasks that start w ith the planning of the organization's staffing needs
and end w ith an employee 's exi t fro m the organi zation. Fi gure I illu strates th e
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chain of events as they occur in an organization. These events form the basis of
the HR function and serve as a guide for determining which specific HR func
tions may be eligible for outsourcing. It is important to distinguish between those
functions that are a core element of the organization/employee relationship (those
that create value for the organization) and those that are not. Two typologies are
used to illustrate this point.
Gilley, Greer, and Rasheed (2004) discuss a strategic typology ofHR activities
developed by Alan Speaker (Greer, 2001) in which HR activities are classified
as having either high or low strategic value and as being either transactional
or relationship-oriented in nature. Their resulting typology shows the quadrant
containing relationship-oriented activities with high strategic value to the firm
to include several HR activities related to training and performance evaluation.
In addition, the quadrant containing transactional activities with high strategic
value includes activities related to staffing, benefits planning, and compliance.
Their article suggests that high strategic value activities and relationship-oriented
activities might not be good candidates for outsourcing activity. Rather, they
suggest that low strategic value activities that are transactional in nature such as
payroll, benefits administration, employee records, and relocation administration
are the best candidates for outsourcing.
A separate, but similar, typology is Lepak and Snell's (1998) model of virtual
HR in which HR activities are classified as either high or low in uniqueness and
high or low in value. A high value activity is one that is directly instrumental
for achieving organizational objectives, while a low value activity is one that
is primarily administrative or transactional in nature. An activity that is low in
uniqueness is one that is routine, while an activity high in uniqueness is considered
idiosyncratic. Lepak and Snell ( 1998) argue that the quadrant representing high
value and high uniqueness contains core HR activities that are most likely to be
carried out internally to obtain a competitive advantage. Thus, these activities
should not typically be outsourced, but other routine administrative activities
located in other quadrants might be outsourced to the growing supply of external
vendors specializing in these activities.
When the HR activities listed by Gilley, eta!. (2004) are located in the HR value
chain, it becomes obvious that portions of each major HR function are potential
candidates for outsourcing. However, three functions in particular, training, per
formance planning and evaluation, and compensation, deal specifically with an
organization's current relationship with its employees. As soon as the employee
is hired, he or she receives some type of training, is informed of job performance
evaluation processes, and is informed of compensation issues related to pay and
benefits. If an employee stays with the organization, the cycle of training, per
formance, and compensation repeats itself many times throughout the course of
the employee's tenure with the organization. The professionalism and fairness
with which an organization performs these activities is directly related to how
employees feel about the organization. Thus, these three functions comprise an
organizational career management system and are crucial in developing corporate
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strategies concerning employee retention, employee value to the organization, and
employee productivity. As such, outsourcing in these three major HR functions
should be considered carefully before any final decisions are made.

The Proposed Model
Because HR outsourcing has received such scant attention in the literature, it
is necessary to address the question of when and under what circumstances HR
outsourcing contributes to firm performance by looking at the literature repre
senting disciplines other than HR. In particular, theory from economics, orga
ni zations, and strategy will be used to develop the proposed framework. Figure
2 depicts the proposed model of the relationship between competition, amount
of HR outsourcing and HR performance. Moderator variables, asset specificity
and three types of environmental uncertainty, are also used to help determine the
conditions under which HR outsourcing may affect HR performance.

Figure 2
Model of HR Outsourcing

P3
+

P1

P6

Supplier Competition and Outsourcing
When people and organizations agree to conduct business together, a process
emerges that helps determine demand, supply, and prices for particular goods and
services. As the number of people and organizations involved in business transac
tions increases, the potential for competition between these groups also increases.
For instance, when the number of sellers in a particular market increase, buyers
have more freedom to pick and choose the organizations with whom they want
to conduct business than they do ifthere are few sellers. Because large numbers
of sellers are trying to capture the same market share, the sellers will compete
with one another in an attempt to obtain as much market share as possible. The
resulting competition may cause the sellers to differentiate their services in terms
of price, quality, or customer service.
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When competition is limited, a decreased quantity of goods and services is
available, and the prices of those goods and services tend to increase. For ex
ample, Lynk (1995) found that mergers between hospitals led to significantly
higher prices in health care service, indicating an exploitation of market power
created by a reduction of competition. In contrast, as competition increases (with
more firms entering the market) the quantity of goods and services available to
potential buyers should also increase. Because neoclassical economic theory as
sumes the buyer to be rational and informed, buyers should choose the product
that best meets their needs and price concerns, thereby choosing the alternative
that is most efficient. Therefore, as competition between external HR provider
firms increases, the quantity of goods and services available to corporate buyers
should also increase with buyers choosing the most efficient alternative.
In the five forces model of competition (Porter, 1980), five competitive forces
determine the state of competition in an industry. Three of these forces, potential
new entrants into a market, substitute products, and rivalry among competing
sellers in a market, often lead to new technology, improved products, and lower
prices. Thus, a firm wishing to outsource HR functions in a strong competitive
vendor environment is likely to benefit from a strong bargaining position.
An organization performing a particular HR activity in-house may not be able
to compete effectively with firms offering the same service externally, particu
larly if an external provider has a competitive advantage unavailable to others.
In this situation, marginal analysis would help determine if the HR activity is
costing more than the worth of the HR activity's contribution to total organization
output. Marginal analysis looks at the changes in costs and benefits that occur
when changes from the status quo are proposed. These marginal changes in the
costs and benefits are the basis for rational economic choice (Eke lund & Tollison,
1991 ). In a competitive situation concerning employee wages, for example, mar
ginal analysis would determine if an employee is worth keeping. If the employee
being analyzed is paid more than the worth of his or her contribution to total
output, it is economically unsound to keep the employee on the payroll. In the
same vein, if an insourced human resource activity costs more to operate than it
is contributing to total output of the organization, it is economically unsound to
continue operating the HR activity internally.
Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937) helps explain this idea further. Trans
action cost refers to the cost of organizing information, protecting the interests
of all parties in the transaction, monitoring the transactions, and other similar
costs involved in a transaction (Aubert, Rivard & Patry, 1996). In a discussion
oftransaction costs, Coase ( 193 7) noted that "a firm will tend to expand until the
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs
of carrying out the same transaction by means of exchange on the open market or
the costs of organizing in another firm," (Coase, 1937, p. 341 ). In other words,
when internal transaction costs equal the cost of purchasing the same good or
service on the open market, the organization will tend to stop producing internally
and purchase from the open market.
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Williamson (1975) suggests that a buyer who is dependent upon one supplier
for goods will be less able to resist or avoid opportunism by the supplier than
a buyer who has several suppliers from whom to purchase goods. The lack of
alternative suppliers may create a small numbers bargaining problem for the
buyer, thus creating an incentive for the buyer to vertically integrate (Levy, 1985).
From an outsourcing perspective, when competition for suppliers of a particular
good or service increases, the number of choices increase, and the ability of a
supplier to engage in opportunistic behavior decreases. The increased level of
competition creates an environment that is more favorable to the buyer in terms
of choice and the ability to use alternate suppliers if necessary. Without several
alternatives, it is doubtful that outsourcing would occur at all since firms would
be hesitant to place themselves in a situation that forces them to be dependent
upon a single supplier.
This concept of transaction cost falls in line with theories of competition, cost
leadership and differentiation strategy (Porter 1980). An organization cannot
afford to compete effectively when it pays more for services or goods than its
competitors unless it differentiates itself clearly from other market providers. If
business competitors use a less expensive but equal method to operate their HR
activities, the organization that continues to pay more for the same service may
be at a competitive disadvantage by not utilizing a cost strategy. Additionally, as
external HR provider firms increase in number, competition among these contract
providers will likely lead to new technology, improved products, and economies
of scale not available to organizations not specializing in the HR activity. External
HR provider firms that exploit either cost advantages or special differentiated ser
vices through improved technology and products may entice many organizations
to outsource. Indeed, in a study of semiconductor firms, Leiblen, et a!. (2002)
found that number of suppliers correlated with greater outsourcing activity.
In summary, increased HR vendor competition may create positive benefits for
organizations purchasing their services. From a neoclassical economic perspec
tive, increased levels of external supplier competition should lower the costs of
externally produced goods causing the rational consumer to purchase the goods
externally rather than producing them internally at a higher cost. Therefore:
Proposition 1: There is a positive relationship between supplier
competition in the external HR provider market and amount
of HR outsourcing.

The Relationship Between Outsourcing and HR Performance
Because firms outsource to increase performance, HR outsourcing should lead
to increased HR performance such that HR outsourcing acts as a mediator between
supplier competition and HR performance. The decision to make or buy is based
on a number of elements in the internal and external environment (White, 2000),
and the idea of competing based on the amount of hard assets owned has shifted
to competing on the basis of intangible assets and capabilities (Gottfredson,
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Puryear & Phillips, 2005). As a result, the amount of outsourcing in areas such
as production and information processing has increased tremendously in the last
several years in an attempt to compete by using the most attractive opportunities
inside and outside the organization. Outsourcing is attractive to upper management
because it improves some of the metrics used to judge company performance. For
instance, "shedding specific assets allows a company to increase return on assets
(ROA) and return on investment (ROI), and decreasing the head count increases
revenue per employee," (Rossetti & Choi, 2005, pp. 48-49). Another benefit of
outsourcing includes reducing prices of goods provided, which in turn leads to
higher price to earning ratios. In summary, firms that outsource any function do
so with the idea that the firm's performance will increase. Several sources indicate
that this is indeed the case (Ellram & Carr, 1994; Smeltzer, Manship & Rossetti,
2003; Velocci, 2001 ), and thus we expect that an increase in HR outsourcing will
result in an increase in HR performance.
Proposition 2: There is a significant mediating effect ofamount
of HR outsourcing on the relationship between supplier com
petition and HR performance.
Asset Specificity
Williamson's (1985, 1986) work on transaction costs expands Coase's (1937)
original theory by defining key aspects of a transaction cost framework. One key
aspect is that of asset specificity, or the investment in assets that are specific to
the requirements of a particular exchange relationship. Research has shown that
asset specificity reduces the degree of outsourcing (Jensen & Rothwell, 1998;
Monteverde & Teece, 1982). For example, in an HR context, asset specificity is
high in a transaction where software is designed to perform a specific HR task
for a specific organization. Transaction costs are likely to be high in this instance
since the software cannot be used in other organizations. Both purchaser and
vendor will desire protections from each other if something goes wrong, thus
increasing costs of the transaction. If asset specificity is low, however, market
transaction costs are likely to be lower and many suppliers should then effectively
compete (Vining & Globerman, 1999). In this scenario, as the number of exter
nal I-IR provider firms offering basic, non-specific service that all organizations

need (e.g. payroll administration) increases, external vendor competition should
increase and cause internally produced services to be more costly to administer.
The key is to determine which activities in the HR value chain have low asset
specificity and can be outsourced without damaging the organization/employee
relationship.
The specific HR tasks or services being outsourced can have an impact on
the relationship proposed in proposition one, particularly if an HR service that
creates a competitive advantage for the firm is outsourced. The concept of asset
specificity is very similar to Klaas, McClendon and Gainey's (2001) concept of
idiosyncratic practices developed by firms to create a strategic HR advantage.
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These idiosyncratic practices are often firm-specific, based on tacit firm knowl
edge, and can limit the ability of an external HR provider firm to provide the
same level of service as an internal HR department. As such, asset specificity
should be accounted for in the competition/amount of HR outsourcing relation
ship. Since prior research has shown that asset specificity reduces the amount of
outsourcing (Jensen & Rothwell, 1998; Monteverde & Teece, 1982), we propose
that asset specificity moderates the relationship between supplier competition
and amount of HR outsourcing.
Proposition 3: There is a negative moderating effect ofHR task
asset specificity on the relationship between supplier competi
tion and amount of HR outsourcing.

Environmental Uncertainty and Outsourcing
Seminal works in the area of environmental uncertainty suggest that the most
effective firms tend to use mechanistic or bureaucratic designs in stable, predict
able environments while organic designs are used by effective firms in unstable,
turbulent environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967). In other words, the type of organizational design used should
match the organization's environment. Although much has been written about the
relationship between environmental uncertainty and organizational design, some
scholars have looked specifically at the role information processing plays in this
relationship (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1974; Huber, 1991 ). Arguments
have been made suggesting that the level of analysis for information process
ing should be the subunit or departmental level rather than the organizational
level because organizations are composed of subunits which are interdependent
(e.g. Tushman & Nadler, 1978).lnformation processing is important because an
organization's ability to process information is tied to environmental uncertainty.
The more uncertain the environment, the more difficult information processing
becomes, and the more likely it is that an organization developing better methods
for processing information will obtain a competitive advantage.
Considering the HR department as a subunit in an organization, it is appro
priate to analyze the structure and process of the HR function in the theoretical
vein suggested by the studies mentioned previously. Seminal research clearly
suggests that in stable, predictable environments, a bureaucratic structure is the
most effective design to use. Therefore, when labor demand and supply are stable
and predictable, outsourcing the HR function, even a bureaucratic one, seems
unnecessary since all market competitors have fairly complete information in an
unchanging market. It would be difficult to obtain a competitive advantage for HR
under these conditions since the resource in question (labor market information)
is not limited to one organization. Indeed, such information is often compiled by
government agencies and dispensed publicly to all interested parties.
A more recent view of environmental uncertainty suggests that uncertainty
is divided into three distinct components - primary, competitive, and supplier
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(Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). The first component, primary uncertainty, refers to "un
certainty arising from exogenous sources, such as natural events, from changes in
preferences, as well as from regulatory changes, such as those involving standards
or tariffs," (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998, p. 3). Competitive uncertainty is defined as
"the uncertainty arising from the actions of potential or actual competitors ... ,"
(Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998, p 4). These two forms of uncertainty are somewhat
similar in an HR outsourcing context in that a firm must deal with the effects of
these types of uncertainty after they occur. For instance, changes in Department of
Labor regulations concerning the status of exempt versus nonexempt employees
and the calculation of overtime have caused many HR departments to recreate the
entire timekeeping process to avoid potential legal problems. When competitors
raise or lower the average wage level for a particular area, HR departments must
decide if they should or should not match the competitor's wage and the impact
that will have on their workforce. Because primary and competitive uncertainty
create a situation in which the firm must react after the event has occurred, it is
expected that high levels of primary and competitive uncertainty will enhance
the ability of firms specializing in HR outsourcing to outperform internal HR
departments. The reasoning for this assumption is based on the idea that firms
specializing in HR services will have more ability to focus on specific HR issues
and will be able to respond more quickly when changes occur.
Proposition 4: There is a positive moderating effect ofprimary
uncertainty on the relationship between amount ofHR outsourc
ing and HR performance.
Proposition 5: There is a positive moderating effect of com
petitive uncertainty on the relationship between amount ofHR
outsourcing and HR performance.
The third type of uncertainty proposed by Sutcliff and Zaheer ( 1998) is sup
plier uncertainty, defined as the behavioral uncertainty of an exchange partner
firm. Supplier uncertainty is related to possible opportunism by the supplier, and
is expected to have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between HR
outsourcing and HR performance. In an HR outsourcing context, an increase in
supplier uncertainty would suggest that the external HR provider firms are in a
position to act in self-serving ways at the expense of the contracting organiza
tion. Thus, an increase in the ability of external HR provider firms to engage in
opportunism could lead to a decrease in HR performance.
Proposition 6: There is a negative moderating effect of sup
plier uncertainty on the relationship between amount of HR
outsourcing and HR performance.
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Model Limitations
The propositions presented are intended to give some solid theoretical back
ground for determining when the HR function should or should not be outsourced.
It is well and good to discuss competitive advantages and employee reactions
concerning outsourcing, but defining the appropriate situation in which to act to
increase HR performance has not yet been established. The proposed model is a
starting point for connecting outsourcing activities to HR performance.
A potential difficulty with the model, however, is adequately defining and mea
suring what is meant by HR performance. In firm-level studies of outsourcing,
profitability and earnings per share may be appropriate measures of performance,
but performance in the HR function is more difficult to quantify in dollar amounts,
although some authors have made progress in this regard (Becker, Huselid &
Ulrich, 200 I). Basic operating cost comparisons can be made easily, but intangible
functions such as creating the appropriate organizational culture or ensuring that
employees feel valued and supported by the organization are difficult to measure
and difficult to translate into dollar amounts. These intangible factors, however,
need to be quantified in order to obtain a valid measure ofHR performance. If the
goal of outsourcing is to improve the function being outsourced, valid measures
must be available to determine whether the outsourcing is successfuL Perhaps
each component in the HR value chain can be analyzed to determine specific
measures for each function that can then be compiled into an overall measure of
HR performance. The measures might include both operating costs and behavioral
components translated into dollar amounts.
In addition, since the dependent variable is HR performance, the knowledge,
skills, and abilities (KSAs) of individuals performing the work are most likely
part of the HR performance measure. The model, however, does not account for
individual contributions to HR performance. Just as HR performance is difficult
to measure, individual KSA contributions to an organization are also difficult
to measure. For instance, the labor relations manager who convinces the local
union to avert a strike certainly has KSAs that contribute value to the firm, but
how should the manager's KSAs be measured? Perhaps colleagues, subordinates,
and supervisors could give a reasonable measure of the manager's KSAs as some
360-degree performance evaluations require, but obtaining 360-degree feedback
for all HR department employees can be impractical, and performance ratings
are often inflated and inaccurate. Thus, although HR performance is likely to be
a function of employees' skills and abilities, employee KSAs are not included
in the model.
Another limitation concerns other functions and departments within the orga
nization. Because HR performance often depends upon the willingness of other
departments to follow organizational policy and procedure, individuals outside of
the HR function may have an impact on HR performance. For example, assume
the HR department adequately conducts sexual harassment workshops and has
tried without success to discipline a vice-president who informs his managers to
ignore all complaints from female employees. The vice-president is a personal
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friend of the CEO, and simply refuses to take sexual harassment seriously.
Lawsuits resulting from sexual harassment complaints may count against HR
performance even though HR employees have done everything possible to stop
sexual harassment.
The factors discussed above and others are likely to contribute to HR perfor
mance that are not considered in the proposed model, and any test of the model
will most likely yield a small r-square value because of the missing variables.
Despite this limitation, the model is adequate as a starting point for determining
how outsourcing affects the relationship between external forces of competition
and HR performance. If the model is significant, it would indicate that the amount
ofHR outsourcing does have an impact on HR performance under certain condi
tions. Since the goal of outsourcing any task is to reduce costs, gain expertise and
control over processes, and improve quality of service (Shelgren, 2004 ), knowing
that HR outsourcing may add value to the firm is a positive step in determining
ways to capitalize on any potential benefits of outsourcing.
Conclusion
A number of organizations have begun to outsource the HR function, and it
would be helpful to understand the impact of outsourcing on firm performance.
Electronic Data Systems will combine forces with Towers Perrin to create an HR
outsourcing company that is expected to bring in $600 million in annual revenues
(Fuquay, 2005), and consulting firm NelsonHall says the worldwide market for
HR outsourcing services is expected to grow 21% annually to $7 billion by 2008
(McDougall, 2005). The sheer size ofthe market for HR outsourcing suggests that
firms should be aware of the forces that indicate outsourcing to be beneficial or
detrimental to the organization. The research to date on HR outsourcing has not
yet determined the circumstances under which HR outsourcing would be most
beneficial, and part of the problem lies with the inability of researchers and firms
to grasp an overall, widely accepted measure of HR performance.
Many HR functions may not lend themselves to outsourcing, and changing the
dependent variable from HR performance to HR function performance for specific
functions such as payroll or employee development may help determine which
functions should or should not be outsourced. The HR value chain illustrates
in a timeline fashion how certain HR activities become tied to an employee's
value to the organization. Training leads to better performance which leads to
higher compensation, and the cycle of training, performance and compensation
repeats itself throughout the life of the employee in the organization. Because
an organization has invested time and money in training employees, the deci
sion to outsource should not be made lightly. If conditions in the environment
and in the organization are conducive to outsourcing, the amount of time and
money invested in the HR professional employees who are to be downsized
should be considered for the sake of the organization as well as for the sake of
the employee.
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Unlike an outsourced manufacturing process, where the cost of goods and qual
ity metrics can clearly show if the outsourced process is successful in meeting
numeric goals of production, HR practices are typically intertwined together to
form a coherent overall strategy that is more difficult to tease apart and measure
individually. The literature on HR bundles illustrates this point (see Macduffie,
1995, for a specific manufacturing example). For instance, an overall strategy that
claims, "People are our most important asset," would suggest that all HR practices
from recruiting to retirement focus on the individual employee to make them feel
like a valued part of the organization. If a specific HR function such as benefits
administration is outsourced to an external provider, however, the employee
may feel more like a number than like a valued employee. At this point, there is
a potential breakdown in the overall strategy, and metrics showing the amount
of money saved by outsourcing benefits administration may look promising, but
employees themselves may feel less committed to the organization. As a result,
other HR performance measures that are typically not calculated in benefits ad
ministration, such as turnover or absenteeism, may increase. HR management
is concerned with the management of people in an organization throughout all
phases of the employment process, and improving one part at the expense of
another part makes little sense. Thus, the emphasis earlier in this paper on core
HR activities with high strategic value is not misplaced, and the authors who
caution that cost should not be the only factor in the decision to outsource have
good reason for their arguments (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Greer, Youngblood
& Gray, 1999; Lever, 1997).
The field of HR management has transformed over the past few decades from
being primarily a record-keeping function to a strategic function that helps develop
strategies for fitting HR practices with the overall organization's strategy. The old
record-keeping functions tend to be routine, bureaucratic, and have low strategic
value; thus, they can probably be outsourced with little effect on the individual
employees of the organization. However, some people do not see the value of
"new" and strategic HR departments because they see all of the HR function as
a bureaucratic, record-keeping function that adds nothing to the firm's bottom
line. Thomas Stewart (1996), for example, suggests that most HR departments
are 80 percent routine administration with no value-added, so the entire HR
department should be abolished; not improved, but completely eliminated. The
problem with Stewart's suggestion is that many researchers have decided that the
acquisition and management of human capital can become a strong competitive
advantage for an organization if handled appropriately (Barney, 1995; Barney &
Wright, 1998; Brockbank, 1999). Since most managers are kept busy with typical
tasks such as production or sales, few have extra time to devote to the human
resource component of the business. This situation means that someone needs to
develop the HR practices that are critical to creating and sustaining a competitive
advantage with human capital. It also means that decisions to outsource the HR
function must be made with the appropriate information, and the research in this
area needs more development and clarity.
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Future research should focus on other organizational characteristics or envi
ronmental characteristics that affect HR performance based on the amount of
outsourcing. Other organizational characteristics might include organization
structure and design, particularly in the HR department itself, or the size of the
organization. Other environmental characteristics might include boundary span
ning capabilities ofthe organization or the level of resource dependence the firm
experiences. Learning more about the conditions under which HR outsourcing
affects specific HR functions would help HR departments plan accordingly when
making decisions to outsource. Although the purpose of this paper is to identify
characteristics of the organization or environment that determine when to out
source HR and subsequent performance, another valuable component of deter
mining whether outsourcing is successful concerns the individuals performing
the work. A more complete model would include organizational, environmental,
and individual employee characteristics that all work in concert to determine the
appropriate situation in which to outsource.
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